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Abstract 
 
Information Technology (IT) event studies often focus on announcement period returns based on the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This approach may have two sets of key limitations. First, the 
use of announcement period assumes the market is efficient in pricing the event. However, a firm not 
be aware of the organizational changes required for success of the IT event, or may not have the 
incentive to disclose such information for competitive reasons. Thus we expect many IT events to be 
characterized by low information disclosure, which may impede efficient pricing by financial markets. 
Second, IT event studies largely rely on CAPM, which only considers systematic risk, and assumes 
that idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk is eliminated through efficient diversification. Yet one of the 
foundations of IS is that IT matters, largely because firms have different capabilities to develop, 
deploy and manage IT resources. Thus there is a disconnect between a basic theoretical tenet of the 
IS field and the methodology deployed to assess the value of IT events. We develop a framework 
involving the maturity of the IT event and the scope of complementary changes to assess the extent of 
information disclosure and idiosyncratic risk. We empirically illustrate our approach for the case of 
large scale IT and IT-enabled outsourcing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One stream of firm-level studies of Information Technology (IT) impacts has deployed market-
based measures of performance developed from capital market theories (Im et al. 2001; Melville et al. 
2004). Such market based models assess the impact of IT “events” on shareholder value by estimating 
the difference between stock market returns conditional on the event and the unconditional expected 
returns over the announcement period. This approach assumes that the market efficiently prices the IT 
event during the announcement period itself. Further, these studies are based on the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), which considers only systematic risks stemming from the macro environment 
of a firm, but not firm specific or idiosyncratic risks (Bettis 1983; Chatterjee et al. 1999). We posit 
that depending on the nature of the IT event, there may be serious issues involving the assumption of 
efficient pricing during the announcement period as well as the exclusion of firm specific risk. 
Therefore we seek to highlight these potential pitfalls and develop a framework to assess the 
suitability of various market based assessment approaches for different categories of IT events.   
The announcement period returns method is based on the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), 
which posits that at any given time, the stock price of a firm reflects all publicly available 
information, and, in turn, the collective belief of investors regarding future prospects of the firm. 
However, for many types of IT events, the market may not have enough information to be efficient 
during the announcement period. While it may appear that greater disclosure by a firm of its IT 
capabilities will help reduce its cost of capital and increase its valuation, research in IS (e.g., Clemons 
1991; Mata et al. 1995) finds that the extent to which IT confers competitive advantage is a function 
of its heterogeneity and imperfect mobility. This implies that information disclosure will likely 
engender competitive parity to an extent not justified by improvement in investor forecasts. This is 
especially pertinent to information on complementary investments in governance structures or work 
processes that determine heterogeneity in returns from IT investments (Brynjolfsson et al. 2002). For 
example, if a firm has conducted a comprehensive, ex ante cost-benefit analysis of a proposed 
investment in IT and business processes, a detailed disclosure of such information may have a 
negative impact in that competitors may act on such information to the detriment of the firm making 
the announcement.  
IT events may also involve substantial uncertainty in the realization of benefits. Any downward 
revision to the ex ante benefits communicated in a detailed announcement will result in an adverse 
reaction from financial markets, thus providing a disincentive for elaborate market disclosure. As a 
result, announcements of IT investments typically entail the nature and broad objective of the 
investment, vendors involved, and a qualitative statement of anticipated benefits. Generally there is no 
mention of risks, options, managerial capabilities and investments in processes and human capital that 
may be needed to realize payoffs from the IT investment. Yet another scenario involves a firm 
undertaking an IT initiative without being aware of the complementary changes required for the 
successful assimilation of the technology applications (Barua et al. 1996; Brynjolfsson et al. 1996; 
Zhu 2004; Tanriverdi 2005). In such cases, there will be no disclosure of the critical non-IT facets of 
the event, making it difficult for the market to assess the likelihood of success within the 
announcement period.  
A twin conundrum that limits the applicability of the market models involves their dependence 
on the CAPM, which incorporates only systematic risks in the pricing of expected returns on assets 
(Fama and MacBeth 1973), and which assumes that unsystematic, firm specific risks are eliminated 
through full diversification. However, theory and research in the field of IS are based on the premise 
that firms differ in their ability to assimilate technology into their work processes, and that such 
differential capability is an important source of competitive advantage (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 
1999; Bharadwaj 2000; Bhatt and Grover 2005). This argument, often invoked in response to Carr’s 
(2003) controversial thesis that “IT doesn’t matter”, underscores the point that even though an IT 
application or innovation may be easily available to most firms today, not all of them will be able to 
take advantage of such an opportunity due to firm specific differences, engendering significant 
variance in firm performance.  
There is also some empirical evidence that IT risk, which is idiosyncratic to the firm, explains 
variance in firm returns. The IT business value and productivity literature reports abnormally high 
estimates of returns to IT investments
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. Further, Dewan et al. (2007) estimate about 30% of the gross 
return on IT investment may be explained by the premium associated with IT risk. They also find that 
IT risk is a significant contributor to firm risk. Thus there is both theoretical and empirical 
justification as to why firm specific differences (and hence, idiosyncratic risk) matter, and why 
deployment of methodologies based on CAPM may not be appropriate for many IT events. Despite 
such theory and evidence, to test the hypothesis that IT investments or decisions matter, IS researchers 
have often used methodologies that assume the alternative hypothesis. Thus, while on the one hand, 
IS theories have touted the idiosyncratic nature of how IT creates value as well as the risk of 
implementing IT successfully, market value based empirical studies have used variants of the capital 
asset pricing model that automatically assume that “IT (or any other idiosyncratic factor) doesn’t 
matter.”  
We propose a framework to qualitatively assess the market efficiency and idiosyncratic risk of 
an IT event which is consistent with the foundations of IS research that (i) early movers have a 
competitive advantage with IT events and that (ii) capabilities to assimilate a new IT event vary 
across firms. This framework offers a resolution to the twin challenges posed by the assumptions of 
CAPM. The framework incorporates the maturity and the organizational scope of the IT event as two 
key elements. Maturity is the extent to which the technical and organizational nuances of a technology 
event are well-understood and documented (Weiss and Dale 1998). The scope of an IT event 
comprises complementary changes that are required for the success of the event. For example, ERP 
implementations will require major changes in business processes, decision rights and incentives to be 
effective (Jarrar et al. 2000). Our theoretical framework enables us to assess the level of market 
efficiency and idiosyncratic risk characterizing an IT event, thereby providing guidance in selecting 
an appropriate methodology to assess the value of the event. We illustrate the use of the framework 
with an analysis of the financial value of large scale outsourcing of IT and IT-enabled business 
functions. We find that the financial market prices these outsourcing announcements inefficiently in 
line with predictions of our model, resulting in long-term abnormal returns following the 
implementation of the outsourcing contract and a reversal of some results established in prior 
research. Further, we find that firm specific factors that influence returns to the outsourcing initiative 
are a significant contributor to the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. Together, the results emphasize the 
need to shift from market models to those that include firm characteristics in pricing IT events that are 
low in maturity and high in the scope of organizational change that they engender. 
 
2. SHORT-TERM MARKET PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Several studies in IS (e.g., Dewan and Ren 2007, Meng and Lee 2007,  Dehning et al. 2003, 
Hunter 2003, Ranganathan and Brown 2003, Subramani and Walden 2001, amongst others) have used 
announcement period returns to provide evidence of value creation or destruction by IT decisions in a 
firm. In doing so, these studies implicitly assume (i) efficient pricing of the decision by financial 
markets, and (ii) diversification of idiosyncratic risk. However, while prior research in IS has assumed 
market efficiency and largely estimated the magnitude and direction of announcement returns, event 
studies have been used in Finance to test market efficiency: 
“…Systematically nonzero abnormal security returns that persist after a particular type of corporate 
event are inconsistent with market efficiency. Accordingly, event studies focusing on long-horizons 
following an event can provide key evidence on market efficiency…” (Kothari and Warner 2004):  
Tests of market efficiency involve estimation of abnormal returns over longer horizons, typically 
twelve months or more. Interest in the finance literature in long-horizon studies was spurred by 
accumulation of evidence inconsistent with the efficient markets hypothesis and the identification of 
risk factors other than market risk that explained variance in firm returns. Yet, there is little research 
in IS that examines whether the response of the financial market to IT choices or events is slow, 
incomplete or even biased.  
 
2.1 Efficiency of Market pricing of IT events 
                                                 
 
The assumption of market efficiency is critical to inferences drawn from short-horizon event studies. 
The finance literature distinguishes between tangible and intangible information. This distinction is 
described as the difference between explicit measures of past performance such as sales or cash flow 
information that can be observed from the firm’s accounting statements and the orthogonal 
component of information about future performance, which is unrelated to past accounting 
performance (Daniel and Titman 2006). Daniel and Titman (2006) demonstrate that there is no 
discernible relation between a firm’s future stock returns and tangible performance information. The 
returns are related to realizations of intangible information. Thus, markets are imprecise in 
interpreting intangible performance information. Daniel and Titman (2006) conjecture intangible 
information is related to firms’ growth opportunities.  
We suggest that large and complex IT decisions are akin to long-term investments. Further, 
even though IT events are represented by their direct costs when expensed in accounting statements, 
we argue that the benefits of the IT decision reflect intangible information on future cash flows. This 
is because many decisions such as governance choices for IT outsourcing or management processes to 
assimilate new technologies that impact returns to the IT investment are rarely announced formally, 
engendering important acquisition costs for such information. Further, even if this information were 
disclosed, financial markets may incur important learning costs in interpreting and in turn, pricing the 
information. 
 
2.2 Idiosyncratic risk 
Another assumption that is integral to short horizon studies is that of diversification of firm specific 
risk. This assumption has been challenged by early studies in strategy (Bettis 1983), which argue that 
the incorporation of unsystematic risk in asset pricing models is especially important since 
idiosyncratic risk, which the equity markets do not reward, lies at the heart of strategic management.   
Empirical studies also contend that markets care about more than just systematic risk. For instance, 
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) find that earnings and cash flow yield, size, and book to market 
ratio are significantly correlated with expected returns in the Japanese market. These variables proxy 
for risks not otherwise accounted for by beta (systematic risk). The relationship between idiosyncratic 
risk and returns is especially pertinent to the pricing of IT events. Heterogeneity in performance of IT 
investments is often attributed to firm level characteristics including organizational structures, 
processes and other capabilities that complement the IT investment (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 
1999; Brynjolfsson et al. 1996). These firm attributes are an important predictor of volatility in cash 
flows from the IT investment and hence, an important component of IT risk.  
Further, the risk associated with large IT decisions, due to the latter’s broad scope and 
salience to a firm’s strategy and operations, is likely to affect firm risk. Dewan et al. (2001) find that 
(a) about 30% of the gross return on IT investment corresponds to the risk premium associated with 
IT risk, and (b) IT risk is an important contributor to firm risk. Together, the results suggest that the 
pricing of IT events must shift from models that consider market risk alone to include idiosyncratic 
firm characteristics and risk. In the next section, we address these issues and offer a theoretical 
resolution for the use of performance measures in market value based IS research.  
 
3. RECONCILING MARKET MEASURES WITH IS RESEARCH 
We present a theoretical framework to classify IT events in terms of the maturity of the event and 
the scope of organizational changes required to successfully assimilate the event. We argue that such 
classification helps us choose the right approach (e.g., short- or long-term market reaction) to assess 
the financial value of the event. IT maturity has been studied in terms of the S-shaped adoption curve, 
which captures how the total number of adopters increases over time. Weiss and Dale (1998) argue 
that IT risks decrease with longevity. Mature technologies are “easy to use and possess the comforting 
attributes of consistent performance and predictable life-cycle costs” (Weiss and Dale 1998). A 
technology’s longevity confers advantages of user trust and a history of incremental improvements 
that have resulted in very stable products and services. Organizational learning that accompanies 
mature technologies also contributes to lower risks of implementation (Boudreau and Rose 2000). The 
idiosyncratic risk associated with low maturity arises from the variance in the ability of firms to 
assimilate a relatively new and unproven technology. Immature technologies adopted by innovative or 
pioneering firms may also confer competitive advantage (Dos Santos et al. 1993), which may wear 
out over time. However, given the risk of failure arising from the unproven nature of the technology, 
it may be difficult for markets to price such events in the short run.  Thus long-term abnormal returns 
are more likely to accrue to events with low maturity.   
  While the maturity of a technology event provides guidance on market efficiency and 
idiosyncratic risk, the scope or the extent of the effort required to manage the IT event is another 
factor that can significantly affect efficiency and risk. Barua et al. (1996), Brynjolfsson et al. (1996), 
Zhu (2004) and Tanriverdi (2005) have argued that successful IT investments need complementary 
organizational changes that involve strategies, business processes, decision rules, and authority. Some 
IT decisions such as the adoption of a new supply chain system require major technology and 
business process changes, not only within the focal firm, but also in partner organizations (Barua et al. 
2004).These changes required for IT events, if not properly managed, can lead to significant 
organizational turmoil, even “jeopardizing the core operations of the implementing organization” 
(Hong and Kim 2002). The greater the investment in complementary organizational capital required 
to implement and manage an IT initiative, the higher the idiosyncratic risk, and the lower the market 
efficiency during the announcement period.  
Together, the maturity and the organizational scope of the IT event determine the ex ante 
uncertainty in cash flows from the IT investment and, in turn, the market efficiency in valuing the 
investment (Figure 1). We illustrate below why Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) initiatives 
characterized by high maturity and scope are likely to be characterized by high idiosyncratic risk and 
announcement period market inefficiency. We then focus on large scale IT services and business 
process outsourcing (low maturity and high scope) and empirically demonstrate the presence of 
idiosyncratic risk and market inefficiency.  
 
               
 
Figure 1.  IT Event Attributes and Market Efficiency 
 
ERP has been in existence since the early nineties (Hong and Kim 2002). Many academic and 
industry studies have uncovered best practices and critical success factors for ERP implementations. 
To that extent, the decision to implement an ERP system today can be considered a mature event. 
However, ERP success is contingent on several complementary organizational changes, including the 
assimilation of new processes and work systems, end user training, top management support, and 
other change management procedures. The business press abounds with examples of high-performing 
firms (e.g., Nestle, Hershey, etc.) which experienced major snafus in their ERP implementations 
because of their inability to make some of these complementary changes (Worthen 2002; Katz 2001). 
Thus, ERP implementations may be associated with high idiosyncratic risk and market inefficiency.  
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To provide some prima facie empirical evidence that markets may significantly underreact to 
ERP events, we consider two published studies by Ranganathan and Brown (2006) and Hayes et al. 
(2001), which found announcement period returns of 1.47% and 0.19% respectively. In line with the 
efficient markets hypothesis, we interpret the increase in the market value of a firm during the 
announcement period as the net present value (NPV) of the ERP project. We use the ERP 
cost/revenue ratio from documented case studies to create a proxy for ERP costs
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, and calculate the 
implied ERP cost for the Ranganathan and Brown (2006) and Hayes et al. (2001) studies as shown in 
Table 1.   
If markets are efficient, then the NPVs in Table 1 represent the true value of ERP 
implementations in the sample. However, are these NPVs large enough for rational managers to invest 
in large, complex, and transformative initiatives like ERP? One survey found that 80% of ERP 
projects experience cost overruns that range between 40 and 85%, while another found an average 
cost overrun of 178% (http://www.snartak.com/erp.htm). It would take a cost overrun of 40.2% (the 
minimum reported overrun in the above survey) and just 6.2% in the cases of Ranganathan and Brown 
(2006) and Hayes et al. (2001) respectively to drive the corresponding NPVs to zero. At the highest 
reported overrun of 178%, the corresponding NPVs would be -439M and -$316M respectively. Given 
the well-documented risks of cost overruns as well as major delays and other organizational 
disruption, senior management would not have approved projects with such high costs and relatively 
low benefits. Assuming firms made rational investment decisions, we can infer that the market under-
reacted to these ERP events during the announcement period, and that only long-term returns can 
capture the impact of such an investment. 
Large scale outsourcing of IT and IT enabled business functions, the focal case for the 
balance of the paper, is a relatively new phenomenon (for example, a majority of our sample of 100 
largest outsourcing engagements occurred after 2000) compared to, say, ERP or EDI. Firms engaging 
in large, complex outsourcing deals are still experimenting with appropriate governance mechanisms, 
reflected in the misfit between governance choices and the nature of the outsourced task in a 
significant percentage of outsourcing engagements (e.g., Mani et al. 2010, Susarla et al. 2009). 
Further, large-scale outsourcing engagements entail significant effort in contract design and 
management, and communication and coordination between the client and vendor, all of which 
necessitate important complementary investments in processes, control structures, and technologies 
(Bapna et al. 2010). Given the low maturity and expansive scope of large scale outsourcing initiatives, 
we expect the latter to be characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, low information disclosure, and 
lowest market efficiency in our framework.    
 
4. MARKET MYOPIA AND IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK IN 
OUTSOURCING  
 
4.1  Theory and Hypotheses Development 
To illustrate the use of our framework and assessment of the financial value of large, complex IT 
events, we collected and analyzed data on the 100 largest outsourcing initiatives implemented 
between 1996 and 2005. At the end of 2008, the outsourcing of IT and IT-enabled business processes 
constituted over 50 percent of the average firm’s technology budget (Gottfredson et al. 2005). Further, 
outsourcing has transitioned from a cost saving tool for transaction intensive functions such as payroll 
to include the externalization of end-to-end business functions such as product development or 
financial management that directly impact firm competitiveness. This shift in the nature of 
outsourcing is evidenced in the growing value of outsourcing contracts – Gartner reported that in 
2007, the average outsourcing contract value was $204 million while the total contract value for that 
year was $30 billion.  
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 In 1999, Hershey spent $115 million on an ERP system (Katz 2001), while Nestle U.S.A., the $8.1 billion 
subsidiary of Nestle, invested $210 million on an ERP project to overhaul its existing IT systems (Worthen 
2002). Using the ratio of ERP investment to revenues, we obtain 2.90 for Hershey (revenue = $3.97 billion in 
1999), and 2.59 for Nestle U.S.A. as the upfront cost of ERP systems as a percentage of revenue. We use 2.74 as 
the average ERP/Revenue ratio. We assume 10% of the upfront cost as annual maintenance cost and 8% as the 
cost of capital.   
However, despite their expanded reach and impact, researchers and practitioners have 
highlighted the high failure rate of emergent large scale outsourcing initiatives, emphasizing that 
organizations remain largely unprepared to manage the transformation brought about by these 
initiatives. As a consequence, although the cost of a large outsourcing decision is tangible because it 
is announced and expensed, its benefits are uncertain and reflect “intangible” information about future 
cash flows. The uncertainty in future cash flows and allied unpredictability in lifecycle costs 
emphasizes the low levels of maturity of emergent, broad outsourcing initiatives in the firm. 
Further, the management of large-scale, end-to-end services outsourcing poses a set of 
challenges that are relatively new and still evolving. Prior research (e.g., Mani et al. 2010; Gopal et al. 
2003) shows that the performance of such outsourcing initiatives is contingent on choice of 
appropriate governance mechanisms, including contractual structures and relationship management 
processes. The need to discern these unique management challenges and invest managerial time and 
effort in solutions in large outsourcing initiatives reflects the relatively greater scope of these 
initiatives. Figure 2 below reflects the transition in outsourcing from the periphery to the core of the 
firm and the allied shift in maturity and organizational scope of the outsourcing initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The shift in maturity and scope of outsourcing initiatives 
 
The relatively low maturity and high scope of large scale outsourcing events render them an 
ideal context to study whether markets are efficient or myopic in their evaluation of complex IT 
decisions. In order to efficiently price the outsourcing event, financial markets must be able to 
distinguish between different types of outsourcing initiatives in terms of various task and relational 
attributes, and their associated management challenges. The outsourcing firm itself may not recognize 
the above challenges and solutions, and even if it does, it may not have the incentive to disclose such 
information for competitive reasons. Thus, financial markets must incur information acquisition costs 
to efficiently price the outsourcing event. In addition to costs the market must expend on acquiring 
information on firm and task attributes that may impact the outcome of outsourcing, the interpretation 
of such information involves important information learning costs. The acquisition and learning costs 
associated with information on the outsourcing event render arbitrage costly. Thus, the assumptions 
that all markets are always in equilibrium and always perfectly arbitraged are inconsistent with the 
nature of the event. We expect that information asymmetries introduced by acquisition and learning 
costs will be persistent and take a long time to be corrected by arbitrage forces. This engenders 
abnormal performance over a long horizon following the outsourcing event so that the price response 
to this IT event refutes the principle of efficient markets:  
 
Hypothesis 1 – Financial markets will be myopic in incorporating information on large-scale 
outsourcing of IT and IT enabled business functions. This results in significant long-term abnormal 
returns following the implementation of the outsourcing initiative. 
 
While CAPM based approaches to assessing IT events do not consider idiosyncratic risk, large scale 
outsourcing of end-to-end functions such as supply chain management or new product development 
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may carry significant risk for the entire firm, for any failure is likely to cause major disruptions to its 
operations. Outsourcing risk starts with the very decision to externalize IT services or one or more 
business function(s). Given that firms differ considerably in their work processes and routines, the 
outcomes of externalization of end-to-end functions may have high variance. For example, a firm may 
have modular processes while another may have a tightly coupled value chain; if both firms decide to 
outsource a given business function, the former is likely to extract more value from the arrangement, 
everything else being equal. Similarly, many firms are less prepared than others to handle the 
management of the outsourcing relationship.  
A second contributor to outsourcing risk stems from the differential ability of firms in 
selecting and executing the right governance mechanism. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) focuses 
on relational uncertainty, and provides guidance on the choice of governance structures to mitigate 
hazards in exchange relationships. For example, Mani et al. (2010) posit that simple outsourcing tasks 
should be governed by arms length relationships and well-defined performance criteria, while more 
complex engagements may require elaborate relational governance mechanisms. Misfit between the 
ideal and actual governance choices lowers operational performance and client satisfaction (Mani et 
al. 2010).   
These above challenges are further exacerbated by factors such as the uncertainty in the 
firm’s business environment (which necessitates frequent changes in the outsourced task(s)) and the 
level of coordination required with the service providers. Mani et al. (2011) demonstrate that more 
complex outsourcing tasks require significant attention to joint action with the vendor and investment 
in communication technologies. Similarly, experience in outsourcing management and prior 
association with vendor(s) are expected to help clients realize favorable outcomes from the 
outsourcing engagement (Mani et al. 2011). In other words, various firm attributes make it easier or 
more difficult for some firms to succeed in their outsourcing endeavors than others. Given the scale 
and impact of the IT event, these attributes that determine abnormal returns to the outsourcing 
initiatives are an important component of idiosyncratic or firm specific risk. Thus we posit:    
 
Hypothesis 2 –Firm characteristics explain variance in the cross section of abnormal returns as well 
as idiosyncratic risk in large-scale outsourcing of IT and IT enabled business functions.  
 
4.2 Data 
Our data comprises of the hundred largest outsourcing initiatives implemented between 1996 and 
2005. The largest outsourcing contracts have important advantages over a similar random sample. 
First, the firm-level economic impact of outsourcing is more likely to be detected when the contract 
value is large. The average lifetime contract value in our sample is $922 million. The aggregate 
contract value of $83 billion represents approximately 18 percent of the total outsourcing contract 
value for the sample period. Second, our focus on large deals reduces the probability of confounding 
events; firms are less likely to sign as large contracts immediately prior or subsequent to the 
outsourcing agreement. Our approach to sample selection follows prior research in finance (e.g., 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1992) that examines the performance impact of managerial decisions such 
as mergers or acquisitions.  
Information on the hundred largest outsourcing initiatives and their governing contracts is 
obtained from International Data Corporation’s (IDC) services contracts database. IDC tracks 
outsourcing contracts signed around the world with the database comprising nearly 21,000 service 
contracts. This data dates back to 1996, and is the primary input to this study. We use Lexis-Nexis and 
the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service to verify and supplement IDC information on announcement 
and signing dates. We use the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) files to compute 
abnormal stock returns, and the Compustat Basic and Research files to assess firm characteristics, 
develop operating performance measures, and estimate insider trading activity. Our final sample 
comprises the 100 largest outsourcing contracts that satisfy two requirements. First, the firm must be 
publicly traded on a major United States stock exchange. Second, information on the contract used to 
govern the outsourcing initiative must be available. Our final sample of 100 contracts includes 66 
firms.  
Outsourcing initiatives in our sample are classified as one of Information Systems (IS) 
Outsourcing, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) or Processing Services, and Application, Network 
and Desktop Management. In the case of IS outsourcing services, the service provider takes 
ownership of and responsibility for managing all or large part of a client’s IS infrastructure and 
operations, often involving customized, one-to-one engagements. If only the network and desktop 
environment are outsourced, the spending is classified as network and desktop management services. 
Likewise, if only the application environment is outsourced, the spending is classified as applications 
outsourcing. Network management services involve the outsourcing of the operations of a specific 
segment or entire network communication system of a company. Desktop management captures 
contracts for which several desktop services are outsourced to the same provider. BPO involves 
outsourcing business processes or functional areas (such as logistics or HR), with performance 
metrics tied to new business opportunities, revenue generation, customer satisfaction and business 
transformation. 
 
4.3 Empirical Analyses and Results 
First, we test the market efficiency hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) by examining the significance of long-
term abnormal returns following the outsourcing event. We also compare the magnitude and direction 
of long-term abnormal returns with that of announcement period returns to establish market myopia. 
Finally, we test Hypothesis 2 by analyzing the impact of various attributes that are idiosyncratic to the 
outsourced task environment on long-term abnormal returns and idiosyncratic risk of the firm. 
 
Long-term Abnormal Returns: As a first test of market efficiency, we report the three year buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for all sample outsourcing firms following the implementation of the 
outsourcing contract. We use the characteristic based matching approach, also known as the event-
time portfolio approach to calculate long-term abnormal returns. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
describe event time BHAR as “the average multi-year return from a strategy of investing in all firms 
that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified holding period versus a comparable 
strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms”. Thus, the BHAR for stock i over holding period T 
is: 
,      (1) 
where BHRi,T is the buy-and-hold return of the sample firm and BHRm,T is the buy-and-hold return of 
the matching control firm over the same period. Here, the buy-and-hold return for holding period T 
beginning time a through time b is: 
,       (2) 
where rit is the return for firm i in month t; in this study, period a is the month after the contract 
effective month and period b is the earlier of the firm’s delisting date or the end of the three year 
period following the contract effective date.  
Following Barber and Lyon (1997), we consider an industry-, size- and book-to-market 
matched sample as a benchmark of returns post implementation of the outsourcing contract. We begin 
with a group of firms in the same two-digit SIC code as the sample that do not engage in a 
strategically significant outsourcing initiative as of the beginning of the contract effective year. From 
this initial screen, a matched firm is defined as the firm that has the lowest absolute value of the joint 
difference in size (equity capitalization) and book-to-market ratio (equity capitalization divided by 
book value of equity).  
We draw on prior research to identify a set of firm, process and relational attributes that may 
influence the uncertainty and complexity of the outsourcing initiative, and in turn, the transaction 
costs and operational and financial gains from outsourcing. These attributes include uncertainty in the 
business requirements of the client (UNCER), coordination requirements of the outsourced task 
(COORDN), prior association between the client and the provider (PRIOR), and experience of the 
outsourcing firm in managing similar outsourcing initiatives (EXP). Uncertainty is measured as the 
variance in the outsourcing firm’s return on assets (RoA) over the three years prior to the contract 
effective year. Anticipated coordination requirements is estimated based on the outsourcing rationale 
for the given business function. We infer trust based on the bid type, which is one of competitive, 
incumbent or sole sourced. Competitive bidding suggests the absence of prior association between the 
firms. Incumbent bidding implies that the outsourcing firm has an existing relationship with the 
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provider. A sole-sourced contract means that the provider is the only provider of the outsourced 
function. The cumulative number of strategic alliances across a firm’s life served as a proxy for the 
depth of its outsourcing experience.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the mean three-year BHAR from outsourcing for the lowest and 
highest 30 percent of firms ordered by UNCER, COORDN, PRIOR and EXP. In line with the greater 
transaction costs of managing complex, uncertain relationships, we find that outsourcing initiatives in 
the highest 30 percent of UNCER and COORDN and the lowest 30 percent of PRIOR and EXP were 
characterized by negative BHAR. In contrast, outsourcing initiatives in the lowest 30 percent of 
UNCER and COORDN and the highest 30 percent of PRIOR and EXP were characterized by positive 
BHAR. The “difference” column reports the difference in returns between the two sub-samples. Panel 
B reports equivalent results for the sample of firms for which all three years’ return data is available - 
the returns reported in Panel A underestimate those in Panel B. The results in Table 2 confirm 
Hypothesis 1: Markets are unable to efficiently price large scale outsourcing events, low in maturity 
and expansive in their scope, resulting in long-term abnormal returns following the event. In 
particular, at the announcement of the event, the market is unable to distinguish between different 
types of outsourcing initiatives in terms of the management challenges and the consequent 
performance impacts.   
 
Announcement Period Returns: As further evidence of market myopia, we report announcement 
period returns and wealth effects for our sample of initiatives in Table 3. Prior research in IS on the 
financial value of outsourcing initiatives has almost exclusively focused on announcement period 
returns. Consistent with this stream of research, we estimate daily abnormal returns for the firms. A 
period of 150 days [-170,-21] prior to the announcement date is used to estimate the market model. 
Significance of the returns is based on the market model standardized residual method with Scholes-
Williams (1977) betas. The estimates from this model are then used to predict daily returns for each 
firm i over three event windows
3
 – a 3 day period [-1,+1], a 12 day period [-10, +1] and a 20 day 
period [-10,+9] surrounding the announcement of the outsourcing initiative.  
Table 3 reports results of the above event analyses for the lowest and highest 30 percent of firms 
ordered by UNCER, COORDN, PRIOR and EXP. Returns are positive and significant for initiatives 
characterized by high coordination complexity. The results are robust to estimation by contract type. 
The insignificance of announcement period returns and reversal of the direction of returns for various 
categories of outsourcing initiatives provide evidence of market myopia in support of Hypothesis 1. 
 
Idiosyncratic Risk and Returns: In order to test Hypothesis 2, we analyze whether (a) characteristics 
of the IT event contribute to the long-term BHAR of the firm, and (b) characteristics of the IT event 
are an important component of idiosyncratic firm risk. In this case, we analyze whether attributes of 
the outsourced task environment – UNCER, COORDN, PRIOR and EXP – influence the BHAR 
following the implementation of the outsourcing contract and the idiosyncratic risk of the outsourcing 
firm. Table 4 presents the results of our analyses. Model I estimates the influence of the firm-, 
process- and relationship-level attributes on the three year BHAR following the implementation of the 
outsourcing contract while controlling for self-selection into the outsourcing decision and choice of 
outsourcing contract
4
. Firm and time effects are also controlled for. Robust standard errors clustered 
by firm are reported in parentheses. We find that uncertainty in the outsourcing firm’s business 
environment, coordination requirements and prior association with the vendor impact returns to the 
outsourcing initiative. The results suggest that complex outsourcing initiatives, characterized by 
changing business requirements and higher levels of coordination, are correlated with dissipation of 
efficiency gains from outsourcing. This is likely because of greater risks of cost overruns, 
opportunism, and coordination failures in these environments. There are “severe limits to what can be 
achieved through contracting” (Banerjee and Duflo 2002) to mitigate these risks, and outsourcing 
                                                 
3
 Prior research in IS has focused almost exclusively on the 3 day window. However, given the scale of the 
initiative, we expect information leakage in the market, and report returns for longer event windows as well. 
 
firms must often invest in appropriate relationship management procedures to counteract the problems 
created by the limitations of contracting. Yet, empirical research (Mani et al. 2010) on outsourcing 
governance finds that the lack of organizational awareness or preparedness for such investments 
results in efficiency losses from outsourcing. Our results are consistent with this outcome. Further, 
they suggest that efficiency losses in complex outsourcing environments are exacerbated by lack of 
prior association between the outsourcing firm and the vendor. 
Model II analyzes whether the characteristics of the outsourced task environment that impact 
returns to the outsourcing initiative are an important component of the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. 
We measure the idiosyncratic risk for each of the outsourcing firms as the annualized standard 
deviation of residuals from a market model regression based on daily returns (Bali et al. 2005, Ali et 
al. 2003, Malkiel and Xu 2006). We find that uncertainty in the firm’s business environment 
positively contribute to the idiosyncratic volatilities of the firm. The results in Table 4 also suggest 
unobserved firm attributes that influence the choice of a contract are associated with long-term returns 
and idiosyncratic risk of the firm.  
Overall, our results confirm that firm capabilities to manage IT events are important 
determinants of returns to the event. Further, our findings suggest that these capabilities are an 
important element of idiosyncratic firm risk. Thus, the use of asset pricing models such as CAPM that 
assume diversification of idiosyncratic risk and only consider non-diversifiable market risk in pricing 
IT events is inconsistent with the very nature of IT events. Abnormal returns to IT events may be 
estimated after controlling for market risk and other risks such as value or growth risks; however, the 
association between these abnormal returns and firm characteristics must be understood to accurately 
price the IT event.   
             
5.  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The above theoretical arguments and empirical evidence have important implications for what 
measures of financial value should be used to price IT events in consonance with the basic tenet that 
firms differ in their ability to manage and extract value from IT investments and that such differences 
are a key source of competitive advantage. In this context, we identify below research issues that 
require attention while testing hypotheses pertaining to the financial value of IT management 
decisions. 
 
Time horizon for calculation of returns to the IT investment: Our study emphasizes the need to 
consider the maturity of the underlying technology and the scope of complementary investments in 
organizational structures and process in valuing the IT event. These attributes provide guidance 
regarding the magnitude of information acquisition and learning costs incurred by financial markets in 
valuing the IT event, and in turn, the efficiency of the market in valuing the IT decision. By using 
announcement period returns for IT events characterized by high scope, many studies have ignored 
acquisition and learning costs associated with information on these IT events (Hypothesis 1) and 
assumed the market model as a predictor of returns unconditional on the event (Hypothesis 2). 
Further, IT events are often the outcome of a series of related events, their announcement being one of 
them. Thus announcement period returns may underestimate the full magnitude of abnormal returns 
related to the IT event. The above problems are minimized by extending the time horizon for 
calculation of abnormal returns. Window lengths of three to five years have been shown to reduce the 
likelihood of confounding events since firms are unlikely to engage in equally economically 
significant initiatives immediately prior or subsequent to the strategic information event. Hence, the 
sample size is largely unaffected in these window lengths.  
 
Model of predicted returns: As argued in Hypothesis 2, CAPM based measures of risk and return are 
inappropriate in determining predicted returns unconditional on information events with low maturity 
and/or high scope. We have demonstrated in the context of outsourcing that incorporating firm 
specific factors such as experience and prior association and task characteristics such as coordination 
requirements can help better explain the variance in abnormal returns. Our prescription of including 
firm and task specific factors in IT value research also relates to sample stratification issues. Studies 
in finance largely analyze uncategorized samples of events that are assumed to be drawn from a 
homogeneous population (Lubatkin and Shrieves 1986). However, emergent research in economics 
suggests that identifying discrete event characteristics and comparing performance outcomes 
associated with each characteristic may reveal important patterns in the market’s price response. For 
instance, in our sample of the 100 largest outsourcing initiatives implemented between 1996 and 
2005, we find no significant long-term abnormal returns. However, the mean three year buy-and-hold 
abnormal return for firms engaged in complex outsourcing initiatives governed by variable price 
contracts and characterized by dynamic process requirements, high coordination costs, lack of prior 
cooperative association with the provider, and limited experience is -21.2 percent. The equivalent 
return for relatively simple outsourcing initiatives governed by fixed price contracts is 17.5 percent. 
Similarly, Gompers et al. (2003) construct a “Governance Index” to proxy for the level of shareholder 
rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the 
lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest 
rights) earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. These studies 
demonstrate how theoretical stratification of the sample can reveal important patterns in returns to 
information events. 
A unique strength of the field of IS is its ability to ascribe meaning to performance differences 
between organizations and the persistence of such differences. Thus, the field is best positioned to 
identify theoretically distinct groups within a sample of firms experiencing the event to identify what 
drives price responses to the event. For instance, prior research in strategy suggests that heterogeneity 
in performance across joint ventures may be explained by various factors - limitations posed by 
partners’ size, age and prior performance, the compatibility between partners, resource 
complementarity, partners’ inability to transfer resources to the venture, or the cumulative experience 
of the firm in managing similar ventures. The assumption that a sample of joint ventures is drawn 
from a homogenous population results in the reporting of returns that fail to reflect these regularities 
in returns to joint venture activity. Thus, moving forward, it is important that research in IS leverage 
its theoretical knowledge of strategic information events to identify drivers of abnormal returns. 
 
Implications for Practice: Our framework has implications for asset managers who seek investment 
opportunities based on major IT events while avoiding the pitfalls. Given the lack of information 
disclosure regarding firm specific competence and risks involved in managing an IT event with low 
maturity and/or high scope of complementary changes, asset managers must incur the cost of learning 
about a firm’s basic ability to manage or mitigate the risks associated with the IT event and to extract 
maximum value through effective governance and the inculcation of a culture of business innovation.   
Traditional asset pricing models have assumed efficiency of capital markets, and largely focused on 
the management of beta or market risk in portfolios. However, our results underscore the inefficiency 
of markets in pricing certain managerial decisions that reflect intangible information on future cash 
flows. This, in turn, points to the opportunity in shifting the focus of asset management from beta to 
the quality of management decisions that impact firms’ competitiveness and strategic value.  
Our study also suggests that since markets under-react to limited information disclosure, senior 
IT managers and business executives should carefully weigh the benefits of more detailed disclosure 
(when the firm is aware of the management challenges as well as its strengths in managing such 
complexity) against potential opportunity costs in the form of its specific skills and expertise 
becoming common knowledge to the advantage of its competitors.    
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$8.3B $8.7B 1.47% $128M $227.4M $91M 
Hayes et al. 
(2001) 
$4.8B $6B 0.19% $11.4M $131.5M $52.5M 
Table 1:  Returns from ERP investments 
 
 
Panel A: Long-term BHAR – Full Sample 
 Lowest 30 percent 
(a) 
Highest 30 percent 
(b) 
Difference 
(a-b) 
UNCERTAINTY  0.34*** -0.56***   0.90*** 
COORDN  0.39*** -0.51***   0.90*** 
PRIOR -0.15***  0.22*** -0.37** 
EXP -0.23***  0.15*** -0.38** 
Panel B: Long-term BHAR – Three Year Sample 
UNCERTAINTY  0.30*** -0.69***   0.99*** 
COORDN  0.33*** -0.65***   0.98*** 
PRIOR -0.24***  0.31*** -0.55** 
EXP -0.33***  0.21*** -0.54** 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table 2:  Long-term Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Returns following Outsourcing Implementations 
 
 
 
Panel A: Abnormal returns for the event period (-10, 9) 
 Lowest 30 percent   Highest 30 percent - 
UNCERTAINTY   2.01%             1.55% 
COORDN   0.87%             2.98%** 
PRIOR -0.03%            -0.64% 
EXP -0.47%             2.45% 
Panel B: Abnormal returns for the event period (-10, 1) 
UNCERTAINTY  0.41%            -0.40% 
COORDN -0.36%             1.84%* 
PRIOR  2.01%*            -1.61%* 
EXP  2.43%             0.57% 
  
Table 3:  Announcement Period Returns following Outsourcing Announcements 
 
 Model I 
(BHAR) 
Model II 
(Idiosyncratic 
Volatility) 
TYPE -0.001  0.149 
(0.114) 
UNCERTAINTY -0.283* 
(0.141) 
 0.485*** 
(0.172) 
STRIMP  0.250 
(0.315) 
 0.214 
(0.348) 
EXP  0.186 
(0.131) 
-0.243 
(0.168) 
COORDN -0.483** 
(0.230) 
-0.107 
(0.142) 
CONTINUITY -0.002 
(0.101) 
-0.153 
(0.123) 
PRIOR   0.199** 
(0.095) 
-0.077 
(0.166) 
PRIOR FIN_PERF -0.091 
(0.119) 
-0.145 
(0.149) 
IMR1 – Outsourcing  0.379 
(0.248) 
-0.512* 
(0.280) 
IMR2 – Contract -0.285* 
(0.144) 
 0.319* 
(0.178) 
Constant  0.099 
(0.110) 
-0.130 
(0.145) 
R-square  0.39  0.36 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4:  Model of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and Idiosyncratic Risk 
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